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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
RONALD GEORGE STORRS, ! 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
i Fourth Judicial District No. 
i CR-88-491 
i Court of Appeals Docket No. 
) 890268-CA 
i Argument Priority 
i Classification No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Did the District Court err in concluding that 
Appellant was lawfully arrested on the officerfs probable cause to 
believe he was in possession of a controlled substance because of 
his presence in a house where controlled substances were seized? 
II. Did the District Court err in concluding that 
probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for possession of a 
controlled substance based on one officer's conclusion that 
Appellant was "high" because he laughed at him and on another 
officerfs conclusion that after his detention the Defendant became 
"mellow"? 
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III. Do the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution give greater protection to Appellant in this case 
than do the provisions of the 4th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no Warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from A FINAL judgment rendered by the 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen in the Fourth District Court, Utah 
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County, State of Utah upon the Defendant's previously entered Plea 
of No Contest to a charge of Possession of Controlled Substance, a 
second degree Felony. The Defendant was sentenced under the next 
lower category of offense, a third degree Felony, to an 
indeterminate term of not more than five (5) years in the Utah 
State Prison. His sentence was suspended and he was placed on 
probation for a term of 18 months upon conditions that he serve 
thirty (30) days in the Utah County Jail and pay a $1,000 fine, 
with an additional $250 to the Victim Reparation Fund. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by criminal information filed 
on December 1, 1988 with Possession of Controlled Substance, a 
second degree Felony. He was released on his own recognizance. A 
preliminary hearing was held on December 27, 1988 in the Circuit 
Court which bound him over to the District Court for arraignment 
and further proceedings. 
Counsel for the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and 
this motion was heard on January 20, 1989 before the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen. In a MEMORANDUM DECISION dated January 31, 
1989 the Honorable Judge Christensen found 1) that the search of 
the Defendant could not be supported by the search warrant alone, 
2) that the search of the Defendant could not be justified on the 
grounds of the "dangerous weapon" exception to the general 
3 
constitutional prohibition against warrantless searchers, but that 
3) the warrantless search of the Defendant's person was justified 
as a search incident to a lawful arrest as the officers had 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant. 
Subsequent to entry of the Court's MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
Defendant entered a conditional plea of No Contest to the charge. 
The final judgment of conviction was entered by Judge Christensen 
on April 7, 1989. Judgment was entered at the next lower category 
of offense (third degree felony) on Defendant's Motion to Sentence 
Under the Next Lower Category of Offense. 
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed in the Court of 
Appeals, State of Utah, on May 3rd, 1989. The trial court 
thereafter granted Defendant's Motion for a Stay of Commitment., 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30, 1988, at about 9 o'clock p.m., several 
officers of the Pleasant Grove City Police Department executed a 
search warrant on the residence of Debbie Nielsen in an attempt to 
find drugs and drug paraphernalia [Preliminary Hearing Transcript 
at 17-18 (PT)]. Defendant, Ronald George Storrs, was visiting in 
the house but was not a resident. The warrant authorized a no-
knock, night time entry of the residence (PT 13) as well as the 
search of "[a]ny person in the residence or any person arriving at 
the residence during the search". The affidavit in support of the 
4 
warrant did not give reasons for the need to search non-residents. 
Appellant was not named, described, or otherwise referred to in 
either the warrant or the affidavit. 
The officers executed the warrant by entering the house 
from several locations without knocking or announcing their 
presence. Immediately upon entering the residence by a side door, a 
plain clothed officer rapidly approached Mr. Storrs who stood in a 
hallway which led to the main-floor kitchen of the residence (PT 
23). When the officer identified himself and said that they had a 
search warrant for the premises and the people inside, Mr. Storrs 
laughed (PT 23). The officer concluded that Mr. Storrs was "high 
on something" (PT 25). 
Mr. Storrs was confronted about five (5) feet from the 
door of a bathroom, in the doorway of which a man was lying (PT 24-
25). Next to this man, within the bathroom itself, was an empty 
syringe (PT 21). While no evidence is in the record as to the 
contents of the syringe and no direct evidence as to its use or 
intended use, it was inferred by a witness that the man had used it 
to inject himself with cocaine (PT 21); No witness testified that 
Mr. Storrs was seen assisting this man nor that he was seen close 
enough to assist him. 
Because of this laugh, and a remark made by Mr. Storrs 
to the officer when told to put his hands on the wall, Mr. Storrs 
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was grabbed, thrown up against a wall, patted down for a weapon (PT 
24) , handcuffed with his hands behind his back (PT 26) and taken 
into another room to be watched while the search of the rest of the 
home continued (PT 24). While detained, he was described as "quiet 
and mellow" (PT 31). Nothing was found in this initial pat-down 
search of Mr. Storrs (PT 26). 
As Appellant was detained, the search of the home 
progressed and drugs were found in the downstairs bedroom of the 
house occupied by Ms. Nielsen and in a pocket of a coat hanging in 
the downstairs recreation room (PT 15-16) . Two other peirsons were 
found in the downstairs bathroom allegedly in the possession of 
cocaine which they were smoking out of an aluminum can (PT 15). 
Once suspected drugs were found in the downstairs portion 
of the residence, the officers downstairs told the officers 
upstairs that the persons downstairs were under arrest for 
possession of cocaine and to search everyone upstairs to see if 
they were in also in possession of drugs. One of those persons was 
Mr. Storrs (PT 16). The search of the persons in the upstairs 
portion of the house was conducted because everyone in the house 
was being arrested for being in possession of controlled substances 
(PT 34) . 
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Mr. Storrs was thereafter searched a second time, more 
thoroughly. A folded piece of paper containing a controlled 
substance was found inside one of his pockets. (PT 32-33). 
No drugs were found in the upstairs portion of the 
residence and Mr. Storrs was never seen by the officers in the 
downstairs area of the residence nor was there any evidence 
presented to show that he had ever been in the downstairs portion 
of the residence. No evidence was introduced to establish that Mr. 
Storrs had been in the home on any prior occasions, or that he had 
any other link to the home's resident, or to any of the other 
persons present, or knowledge of or connection with any of the 
others1 independent use or possession of controlled substances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The arresting officers did not have probable cause 
sufficient to form the reasonable belief that Appellant had either 
the ability or intent to exercise dominion or control over the 
controlled substances found elsewhere in the home. His mere 
presence in the home where drugs were found - without other 
probable cause independent of that which supported arrest of the 
other occupants and specific to Mr. Storrs - did not establish a 
nexus between him and the contraband. His arrest, therefore, was 
unlawful and the search founded thereon illegal. 
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POINT II 
Laughing at a police officer, like "nervous behavior," 
"furtive gestures," and other subjective manifestations of "wrong-
doing", is not, in and of itself, an adequate indication that a 
person is "high" on drugs or that he is in possession of drugs. 
This observation did not provide legally sufficient probcible cause 
upon which to base an arrest. The similarly subjective observation 
that Appellant became "mellow" after detention is likewise 
inadequate as an indicator of criminal activity. Appellant's 
arrest for these reasons was unlawful and the search incident 
thereto illegal. 
POINT III 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, though 
traditionally interpreted similarly to its federal counterpart, is 
susceptible of being interpreted by this Court as giving greater 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures - especially 
in the home - because of the mood of the people regarding 
governmental interference at the time the provision was enacted. 
The Utah Supreme Court has shown an inclination to so interpret the 
Utah Constitution if the issue is properly brought before it. This 
Court should use this opportunity to help in the development of an 
independent Utah Constitutional authority for a stricter, broader 
state standard regarding searches and seizures. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
For purposes of this brief, Appellant accepts the trial 
court's ruling that the search of Appellant cannot be founded on 
the face of the warrant, alone. Appellant therefore does not cite 
to authorities that would not expand the specific language of the 
warrant to imply coverage of unnamed persons or places, without 
independent probable cause. Nevertheless, Appellant reserves 
argument on this issue should the State seek to justify the search 
on the strength of the warrant. 
Similarly, Appellant accepts the trial court's ruling 
that the search and seizure was not justified by reason of the 
"dangerous weapon" exception to the general constitutional 
prohibition against warrantless searches set forth in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and codified in this state in Section 77-7-
16, Utah Code. For purposes of this brief, Appellant accepts that 
his initial brief detention and pat-down was reasonable for the 
safety of the officers conducting the search and to secure the 
premises. Consequently, Appellant does not here argue the 
application of such "Terry" principals but likewise reserves 
argument on this issue in the event the State urges that the search 
was founded on the principals of a pre-arrest justification. 
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Appellant does, however, argue that the detention beyond 
the need for protection of the officers and the security of the 
premises was unreasonable and that the trial court erred in 
concluding that Appellant was lawfully arrested and searched 
incident thereto. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
LAWFULLY ARRESTED ON THE OFFICER'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE HE WAS IN POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
SIMPLY BECAUSE OF HIS PRESENCE IN A HOUSE WHERE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE SEIZED 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-2 (Supp. 1988), as part of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, defines "Possession" or "use" to 
mean-
e03 the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, 
holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, or 
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or 
consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of 
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or 
group possession or use of controlled substances. For a 
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled 
substance, it is not required that he be shown to have 
individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he 
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, 
possession, or control of any substance with knowledge 
that the activity was occurring. Utah Code Annotated § 
58-73-2(27) (Supp. 1988). 
In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987) the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the State needed to establish that the 
produced contraband was 
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found in a place or under circumstances indicating that 
the accused had the ability and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a 
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot, 
without more, support a finding of its knowing and 
intentional possession by the accused. There must be 
some additional nexus between the accused and the 
contraband to show that the accused had the power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132. 
To the same effect see State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). This rule is also 
seen in other jurisdictions. See for example State v. Hystad, 3 6 
Wash.App. 42, 671 P.2d 793, 798 (1983); State v. Davis, 16 
Wash.App. 657, 558 P.2d 263, 264 (1977); Petty v. People, 167 Colo. 
240, 447 P.2d 217, 220 (1968); Glispev v. Sheriff, Carson City, 89 
Nev. 221, 510 P.2d 623, 624 (1973). 
As the authorities indicate, before a person can be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance, the State must 
show that the contraband was subject to the dominion and control of 
that person, with the intent to exercise dominion and control. The 
mere presence on the premises, even in the portion of the premises 
where the contraband is found, is not enough to convict without the 
showing of requisite intent and dominion and control of the 
contraband by the accused. Arrest for this offense must be for 
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probable cause to believe one is reasonably suspected dominion, 
control, and intent. 
In this case, Appellant was initially observed by two 
different police officers to be standing in a hallway leading to 
the kitchen area adjacent to the main-floor front room of the 
premises to be searched. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 2 and 10). 
Approximately three to five feet away from the Appellant was an 
individual who was lying partially inside the bathroom, which 
evidently opens into the hallway in which the Appellant was 
standing. The head and shoulders of the individual were in the 
hallway and the remainder of his body was in the bathroom. 
Allegedly found on the floor, next to the man who was lying on the 
floor, was an empty syringe. One of the officers specifically said 
that the syringe was not in the hallway, where Appellant might have 
been more likely to have had direct knowledge of it (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 12). It was also testified to that the syringe was in 
plain view once you got into the bathroom (Emphasis added) (PT 
20) . 
There is no evidence that Appellant had actual knowledge 
of the presence of the syringe or that he had any knowledge what 
the syringe had been used for, that it in fact had been recently 
used, that the contents of the syringe was lawful or unlawful to 
possess, that Appellant had handled the syringe, or that Appellant 
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showed recent or past needle marks. No evidence was introduced that 
would indicate Appellant aided the other man in the other's 
preparation or independent use of the syringe or that the syringe 
was an implement customarily used for more than one injection. 
Appellant's mere proximity to another who was suspected of drug use 
did not provide the necessary nexus between Appellant and the 
suspected use by the another. 
The only drugs found during the search of the premises, 
prior to the second, extensive search of Appellant's person, were 
found in the downstairs portion of the house - areas where the 
officers had reason to believe Appellant had not been. The specific 
assignment in the mind of the officers in searching the premises, 
was to go quickly to the basement area and try to find a particular 
person (Debbie Nielsen) suspecting of selling controlled substances 
(PT 14). This is what was done. As soon as entry was made 
Appellant was found upstairs. In the process of this search, two 
individuals were seen in the basement bathroom allegedly smoking a 
controlled substance out of a can. Controlled substances were 
found in other parts of the basement, including a bedroom, and an 
inside pocket of a coat hanging in the basement recreation room. It 
was not established by testimony that Appellant was a usual or 
frequent occupant of the residence or that he used or shared the 
bedroom downstairs or that the coat in the recreation room belonged 
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to or was used by him. Nor was it established or argued that 
Appellant had been in the downstairs portion of the residence at 
anytime immediately prior to or during the search, or for that 
matter, at any time. 
Once drugs were found in the downstairs portions of the 
residence, as stated by one of the officers involved in the search-
We went upstairs or [sic] we secured everyone, advised all the 
officers in the house that cocaine was present in the residence, 
and advised the officers, which one of them would be Sgt. Steve 
Frampton from Pleasant Grove Police Department, who was upstairs, 
was in charge of security of the people, advised these officers 
that people present were under arrest for possession of cocaine and 
to search all of these people, check them to see if they were in 
possession. One of them specifically would have been Ronald Storrs 
[the Defendant].Trans. Suppress. Hearing, p. 16 (PT 16). 
It is clear that the State made no showing that the 
arresting officers had reason to believe Appellant had knowledge of 
much less exercised dominion and control over the controlled 
substances found in the downstairs portion of the premises. Using 
the State's rationale for the arrest, any person found in the house 
at the time that drugs or other contraband were found in the 
downstairs portion of the house would be subject to search as also 
being "in possession" of the drugs or other contraband, no matter 
where in the residence they were. This rationale would extend to 
delivery persons, persons making a professional visit such as a 
social worker, clergymen or other religious visitors, neighbors who 
dropped by to borrow something or to chat, and to friends who 
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stopped by for a visit. It is not inconceivable that such a 
distortion of the law could be further extended to persons standing 
inside of an attached garage or to persons standing in the 
backyard, where it is evident that they entered the yard via the 
residence itself. 
This is not simply a case of the officers failing to 
develop the necessary quantum of evidence to arrive at an 
acceptable threshold of knowledge that can be considered probable 
cause for an arrest of Appellant on suspicion of drug possession. 
Rather, the evidence the searching officers discovered in the home 
supports only an opposite conclusion - that Appellant was not 
involved in the drug possession. Appellant's mere presence in a 
residence where drugs were found in the independent possession of 
others did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The search of 
his person based on such unlawful arrest should, therefore, have 
been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROBABLE 
CAUSE EXISTED FOR APPELLANT'S ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BASED ON ONE OFFICER'S CONCLUSION 
THAT HE WAS "HIGH" BECAUSE HE LAUGHED AT HIM AN ON 
ANOTHER OFFICER'S CONCLUSION THAT AFTER HIS DETENTION, 
APPELLANT BECAME "MELLOW" 
It was the testimony of one of the police officers that 
Appellant laughed at him when he was told that they were there to 
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serve a search warrant. It was the officer's conclusion fl[t]hat he 
was high on something when he started laughing at me." (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 12). For his laugh, Appellant was searched, thrown up 
against the wall when he made a remark, handcuffed behind his back 
and seated on a couch in the front room of the premises being 
searched. The officer who took this action came to the conclusion, 
without any other evidence, that Appellant was "high11. 
It has been held in numerous cases that evidence of 
nervous behavior or so-called "furtive gestures", without more, 
does not rise to the level of articulable suspicion of wrong-doing. 
See State v. Schlosser. 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah 1989) 
(acting "fidgety" not sufficient to rise to level of articulable 
suspicion); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987) 
(nervous behavior does not rise to level of reasonable suspicion); 
State v. Holmes, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 74, 77 (Utah App. 1989) 
(furtive movements or gestures alone are insufficient to constitute 
probable cause for search or arrest and other factors must be shown 
which, in the totality of the circumstances, would lead a 
reasonable and prudent person to believe that there is evidence of 
criminal activity); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App. 
1988) (failure to make eye contact, as nervous conduct, when 
confronted by a Highway Patrol trooper is consistent with innocent, 
as well as criminal behavior); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 944-45 
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seizure area in^oivin^ traffic st~rr ^ ^ -"v% 
a/* -^  nervous benu* . * ;. > >.• jerson ^ - :;f. r ; : . 
behavior t^ another failure to make eve contact and othe- s^~ 
cal ] pd t-\jr^n^ ^* nrrvous be r * * " 
. • , .inocent uu;i r cls <a resuJt or finaing r. lmseir in 
the presence /:t i .aw enforcement office- r^ n n n j P ^ a n f experience 
for most r*~ • r wrong-
doing or iiv_i. "To say ; ' .r 'urtive movements *.r nervous behavior 
alone are cin indicia of criminal behavioi iininirp mini in 
behavior. Another reason for the rule is that observing and 
articulating the reasons and rationale for "nervous behavior" and 
"furtive movements" calls for a totally subjective analysis on the 
part of the person making the observation. Such subjective 
observations, without more, are an inherently inaccurate indicator 
of human guilt or wrongdoing and enjoy no reliability at all. 
It is clear that so-called "nervous behavior" is not 
limited to failure to make eye contact with police officers, 
slouching down in a seat, glancing around oneself, etc. Nervous 
behavior can include a laugh, cry, rapid breathing, etc., It can 
include essentially any manifestation of human emotion. As with 
the cases involving eye contact and furtive movements, it is clear 
that other manifestations of nervousness have not been accorded any 
weight as evidence of wrong-doing or guilty knowledge. Likewise, 
these manifestations, without more, should not be used as an 
indicia that the subject manifesting them is "high", as was done in 
the instant case. 
In the case at hand when Appellant was confronted by 
police officers who entered the premises without knocking or 
announcing themselves, and who told him that they had a warrant to 
search the premises and the persons inside, he laughed. Perhaps he 
laughed where another person might have put a hand over his mouth 
and deeply inhaled. Another person might have uttered an 
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expletive. Another might have said r»^+-^~q ->-d -^^t stoou tv^ 
Per •_ *_
 4 ^ wac nrsuie 
what rtas saiu, - -i « ^ - understand the impo.t of *-he were- cr was 
unsure wha* * ^e^+* >t~*- er -nr -
1 a/t l g h e d . < . , • . *t v>i
 4l. :* be ie ^ : s t r e s s 
c a l l i n g fc n e r v o u s b e h a v i o r f o r :".. p e r s o n v n n o ^ ^ - ^ ^ - ^.s 
g u i l t i , Nu i m p o r t i r . - " . . - t 
a s t h e r e c a n b ^ n^ n i i ^ i L a n c e put . ; n - i i c l r *• h.a:. : * 
t h a t h e l o o k e d a r o u n d h i n s p ; f ^ H *+• t-~^  ^- • <^rc ^ i S d i a n " . 
T h i 1 » M^c:nn i in| i | «p l i -» , i i i I, I i i M . u l u s ' o n t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t 
w a s " n e r v o u s " , b u t a l s o t h a t h e w a s " h i g h " , 
L I V P V M C P +-KO } *>v<~ - c o u r t ' . 
s i : . . 'x*K^ ^ A i-i-.'v, L.ecaLe q u i e t , an . : ^ ' ne 
w o r d s c r t h e o f f i c e r *. , .• m a t c h i n g r " - e l l o w " a f > p ^ • •--
i n i f i a i lau-r*- ~ - - . . . 
: . s e a r c . . ^ ' , . i i e u ubu i i - . i D L S oa'- 'k. *nd s e a t e d n -, r :" * ~:i 
a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w a t c h i n a ' •- '^ ' - : ^ ! v i 
°ub~ ; -•- *- ;
 t L -. - .. r , „e 
. j u ^ i i t c J i , i u r t ] v q e s t u r e s , o r i n d i c a t i o n s ot n e r v o u s n e s s , •ei ivj 
" m e l J o u 1 1 i s * - ^ a c o ^ r d e n *• \ : r i n h * ' e f ^ r 
i • . w r o n g d c , -q i« * i s l i - ^ c ^ u ^ ^ . 
i n d i c a t i o n t h i 4 : • *i^ p e r s o n b e i n q " m e l l o w " ^ n d e r - ^*=- irf* '-lerce o r 
^ * p o s s e s s i o n u i cc * - ; . n a t 
being manhandled by police officers, detained against your will, 
and cuffed with your hands against your back can be a sobering 
experience• Becoming "mellow" after being forced to undergo such 
an experience is not to be considered unusual; and the District 
Court erred when it considered being mellow in determining that 
there was probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant• 
As this laughter and so-called "mellowness" has no legal 
significance in developing probable cause to detain, search or to 
arrest Appellant, and there was no articulable suspicion on the 
part of the officers that any exception to the rule against 
warrantless searches might apply, the officers had absolutely no 
reason whatsoever to initially detain and cuff the Defendant or to 
arrest and re-search the Defendant at a later time. Proper 
procedure in such a matter would have been to determine his 
identity and ascertain whether he was a regular occupant of the 
premises. Once it was determined that he was not, he should have 
been released, absent, of course, sufficient evidence that he was 
in illegal possession of contraband, which is discussed in Point I, 
supra. 
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POINT ITT 
IT Siiw. ^ 
UNDER THE 
FOUND TO E 
CONSTITUTT 
J THAT THIS SEIZURE IS "UNREASONABLE" 
F^ THE UTAH CONSTITUTION EVEN IF NOT 
E" UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
"D STATES 
. ^ i^xi. , ^rt- • ;™ n 4 of the Constitution 
is essentially identica * t't word i no of t> A Feuv'*~b AmerrtmenL LO 
the United --•t~-- - , .: /r:; -_ .on 
being '.,;:ai A, :..icle 1, Section * : • ne i tah Jonstituticn replaces 
a semi-color for a comma after f^^ **"->*--* M* ic ited" 
1 icessar.
 m irrtpAJ tnar. H^ 
meaning of - e i 1 ar constitutional provision is th^ same a.- ; fc s 
federal counterpart %r+.,.ir - <-*or+- -
yedrr- *--> .t: :. jjjnterpart *,*.=. idii, ieu 'ie provision 
was passed ,.T .1 *tate which was t ir ? emoveci f-oni tKe r^r^i"it\ and 
life styl^ * . . > : <=* 
::.cate oi lad sufiereu a iarq* degree -t federal lnvjlvemer.- :n 
its religious and family affairs <*nd federal ""^cps were r" •*• 1 
i . , i.*.^, a rel .g .OuJ 
ins;. ,. iui , vnicfi was oelieved * t e a .-.acrec orde4 : msn1 :n 
authority . - '-,— -  -o;^gi o u s drK} secu^ -
-
i
 . 1 ^  t pressure was K I O U ^ H -^tm: tgai::s 
Stare. Many citizens ot the State cont i nue 1 *• n-i-i-i-p polygamy 
and iiaa ct jvetiii 1 * • c «..". ; 
that entry into their homes was restricted. It is not unrealistic 
to presume that many of those persons practicing polygamy may have 
been in positions of influence both in respect to the public at 
large and to those representing them in the state legislature, or 
may have been members of the legislative body themselves. Neither 
is it unreasonable to presume therefore that because of this 
historical and probably pervasive attitude of alienation,the State 
constitutional provision gives greater protection to the citizens 
of the State of Utah, then does the Constitution of the United 
States to the citizens of the United States. 
An analysis of the question is hindered considerably by 
the dearth of cases in support of such a position or any indication 
of legislative intent associated with the adoption of Article I, 
Section 14, in stark contrast to the recorded debates over the 
ratification of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. The following appears to be the entire record of 
the proceedings as to Article I, Section 14: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will take up Section 
14. 
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment. 
Official Reports and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt 
Lake City on the 4th Day of March, 1895 to Adopt a Constitution for 
the State of Utah. 319 (1898). 
It is nevertheless submitted that this Court can, in an 
appropriate situation, give a more liberal, independent, and 
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protective interpretation to IMhP Utah Constitution than that given 
t • i i , • i • i r ji in l in 111 „ i a "i; J p t t n e v i e u o i i; h e 
ldajiu Supreme * '.Mjrr. wnich unanimously stated 
[The, _ ._..*, ii.J state constitutions u . ive _:e^: ,y, 
from independent sources, _ ;s,j state courts are at 
liberty to find within the provisions of their o\*n 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded uncc-j 
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, [citations] This is true even when 
the constitutional provisions implicated contain simi1 ar 
phraseology. Long gone are the days 
when state courts will blindly apply United States 
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when m Lhe 
process of interpreting their own constitutions.State v. 
Newman. 108 Idaho 5, 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6 
(1985) (emphasis added) quoted in State v. Johnson, 110 
Idaho 516, 71A P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986). 
S , i .ere stated b} the Mississippi Supreme 
Court when it stated that 
We accord to the u *:; - :- ipreme CCJII ^ ^ t^iuost re^tr^ . I 
:i ts interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. We must 
however, reserve for this Court the sole and absolute 
right to make the final interpretation of our state 
Constitution and, while of great persuasion, we will i%;ot 
concede that simply because the U.S. Supreme Court ~d 
interpret a U.S. Constitutional provision that we m..b-
give the same interpretation to essentially the sam-
words m :i provision of our state Constituticr 
Penick v. :Jtate . * " <- - **d 54 7 '~i--. 1 ^ i. 
Other states have also constr^d ttoir state 
constitutional rr^^^^^*- -^ -~-v: J:-- •* ' 
: .,- , Amendme.i, i. State v. Jones, 
706 P.2d (Alaska 1985) the Ala?^ ^u^reme "ourt i^ uiia that 
x u b l l U U l C *!<• cnirh a s 
Article I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those 
granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal 
constitution." The Washington Supreme Court made a similar 
decision. State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984). 
In contrast to the decided lack of case law in support of 
these greater State protections, Utah case law does explicitly 
suggest the possibility of a different construction for Article 1, 
Section 14 than is given the Fourth Amendment. In the case of 
State v. Watts Chief Justice Hall stated that though [we have 
declined] 
to depart in this case from our consistent refusal 
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our 
constitution in a manner different from the fourth 
amendment to the federal constitution, we have by no 
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some 
future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah 
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove 
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's 
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts.State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8 
(Utah 1988). 
Other cases in which the need to brief state 
constitutional issues have been urged, with an obvious eye toward 
potentially expanding the coverage of the state provisions, include 
State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah L986) (in 
which Justice Durham specifically stated that the Court approved 
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the formula of scholastic commentary and ana vtir -orhr -w, *-Jr 
ana vr: na •-*• -1 i ; . _: e 
CL«. : ; ..-iMiOii ..J State v. Jewe1 r - <• :*>-
1985} ; snd State v. Hygh - ** '- - / 2 (Utah 1985) 
(/, i iiimemirii!, «^reme ^ourt las 
repeatedly irv^^a argument ,*r t:i := ss.e. 
£ c: p n •• *
 tj I 13 r i r ^  ; * 
i.- .,•- , ^P applicable >
 4 eiv.dj.fi ^se, us CJU** 
requires that the matter be touched on •*" 'N ^ri i leve See 
State -.rsr 
19 *' ' James v. Prestun, "*^ t-.zd /9y, -. : I 98~) . 
The problem with <= K ^ * requirement s uidt 
ef4' * - • araumerr because there .: no 
case jaw t< ^ A i. : . r* :; - irgament. This results ir ; s:rj 
. . .. .iiSiitui. L. ,. . .d: •• • :e jreai.-ir 
protection then tV- federal constitution ev\ thounh fh-^ -r^ 
e.^ :;;. * ' . i .*•* . oecause or n e -*ck ct cases ^nd 
precedent i::r t :u- araued nn^ition. ^ e r n fcrc *^~ ul urie 
presen4 •- * .,_ ^ . DC . no: . . *.iq np tho 
point. Ir ;\ is Drought up, . * . * * * * K. present case there 
--i :u incentive, WJ_ point, m m 
allegation that the state constitution provides greater protection 
in the area. 
In this case counsel did specifically argue that a 
different interpretation was possible under the provisions of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution (PT 9-11). Counsel 
for the State responded briefly (PT 12). 
Also, it is clear that the State and the officers 
involved perceive that the officers were acting pursuant to Section 
77-7-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and to Section 77-23-1 et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). Any time that a police officer acts 
pursuant to these statute, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is implicitly raised and is applicable to any 
discussion based on search and seizure issues, whether or not the 
arguments submitted by counsel are primarily based on federal case 
law is immaterial. 
If this Court were to take a position on the relative and 
independent protections founded in Article I, Section 14, it is 
felt that the conflicting federal interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution would be unraveled and 
police officers and practitioners and the general citizenry of the 
state would be able to rely on a bright line - if not a "brighter 
line" - approach to many of the issues raised in this area, issues 
which are aggravated by continuing and conflicting federal 
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decision? bright 5 ,PP approach wcil - *-<=> * ^^ro*- ' i TKt 
the — -r -
enajtea \ ~^un. •
 feicoiii< T, .- i ".ic'^ e persons callec i *3 
act under an« ^ntprnrpt Ar+^cl^ "* e^-*-:~ *-i 
C< * *ji'j..ic..". v ,^  Jurist /.ut.L-i - "he 
United States or i -t •* : \ basis, 
3L'., _ , . ^  . ^ . . , . governmental officers vnr - . •: ** * . n 
it conveniens t violate the- la*/ ^ecausp of - n n f i i ^ i ^ 
cumbersome *• l * oixi .;, "lore 
problems an they remedy. 
This Court ^hnnin h'%1'1 '"hat tne Con-'4" " l 
uoraanaing a^d ^xa^tiny a u n a j i : f:r.^ r 
does tne federal constitution 'his v'out --h. *;1 explore wh^twov 
the histcr1' ~>L our t>i . i--,. . - . 
t-xa, , „ .t- » searcij ^^ a. *•: r vitnm • dwelling demands 
articulation of probable cause * ^fidavi 4* i"-Jor<~~«r • 
..'uiiJUi . - urthe- *n s Coui ^  r. ?* * : * " 
state Supreme Cour-* ** -n^ i-o -» dor-isi'^ . ' ~ > 
, . , C1 3 L >u than j. S t i u :- L. 3 U 
• **-- ^ ' ne - r-K or case authority iv leqisKr ive Pi?t^r' 
because that Court »-..*. ,.i_ ~ 
the statutory restrictions on its jurisdiction to review criminal 
cases where this issue is most likely to be raised. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should 
be reversed as the State failed to show that the officers had the 
necessary probable cause required by the federal constitution and 
the existing interpretations of the Utah Constitution to effect the 
arrest upon which the search was based. Further, although the case 
law is sparse and the distinction difficult to make in light of the 
lack of legislative history, the provisions of Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution can and should be interpreted 
independent of the federal constitution to broaden the protections 
afforded the people of the state to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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